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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS CLAUSE-LIBERTY INTEREST OF
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT-The United States Supreme Court has held
that a criminal defendant has a protected liberty interest under
the Fourteenth Amendment in freedom from involuntary adminis-
tration of antipsychotic medication which requires the State to
prove both the medical appropriateness and the necessity of the
medication in order to continue its administration once the crimi-
nal defendant has moved to terminate medication.
Riggins v Nevada, US , 112 S Ct 1810 (1992).
David Riggins was arrested for murder and robbery in November
1987.1 A few days after his arrest, Riggins complained of hearing
voices and having problems sleeping, and was prescribed Mellaril,
an antipsychotic drug, at a level of 100 milligrams daily.2 This dos-
age was gradually increased to 800 milligrams daily in response to
Riggins' continued complaints that he still heard voices and had
trouble sleeping.3
In January 1988, the Clark County District Court allowed Rig-
gins' motion for a determination of his competence to stand trial.4
Examinations were performed by three court-appointed psychia-
trists during February and March 1988 while Riggins was receiving
450 milligrams of Mellaril daily.5 Based on their findings, the dis-
trict court ruled that Riggins was legally sane and competent to
stand trial.6
Riggins filed a second motion in the district court in June 1988
to suspend administration of his medication until the conclusion of
1. Riggins v Nevada, US , 112 S Ct 1810, 1812 (1992). Paul Wade was found
dead in his Las Vegas apartment in November 1987. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1812. A later
autopsy disclosed that he had died of multiple stab wounds to the head, chest and back. Id.
David Riggins was taken into custody in connection with the murder approximately 2 days
later. Id.
2. Id. Riggins told Dr. R. Edward Quass, a private psychiatrist who treated patients
at the jail in which Riggins was being held, that he had successfully been treated with Mel-
laril in the past. Id. Mellaril is the trade name for the antipsychotic drug, thioridazine. Id.
3. Id. Riggins also received Dilantin, an antiepileptic drug. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Two of the three doctors, Dr. William O'Gorman and Dr. Franklin Master,
found that Riggins was competent to stand trial. Id. The third doctor, Dr. Jack Jurasky,
concluded that Riggins was not competent to stand trial. Id.
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his trial.7 In his motion Riggins relied on both the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Nevada Constitution to support his argument
that continued administration of the drugs would infringe upon his
freedom and affect his demeanor at trial such that he would be
denied due process.8 He also argued that his presentation of an
insanity defense required that he be able to show the jurors his
"true mental state." In its answer to Riggins' motion, the prosecu-
tion cited section 178.400 of the Nevada Revised Statutes" and
stated that the court had authority to require Riggins to take med-
ication necessary to ensure his competence for trial."
In July 1988, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on
Riggins' motion. Three court-appointed psychiatrists testified as to
their opinions concerning the effect of Mellaril on Riggins and his
competency to stand trial."2 A fourth psychiatrist did not testify,
but instead presented a written report to the court stating his
views on Riggins' competency."3 The district court proceded to
deny Riggins' motion without giving any indication of the reason-
ing behind its decision. 4
During the trial Riggins put forth an insanity defense and testi-
fied on his own behalf.'5 Evidence was presented showing that Rig-
gins had killed Wade by stabbing him thirty-two times with a
7. Id. Riggins wanted to suspend administration of both Mellaril and Dilantin dur-
ing the trial. Id.
8. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment states, "No State shall. . . deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
9. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1812.
10. Id at 1812-13. The Nevada statute states, "An incompetent person cannot be
tried, sentenced or punished for a public offense." Nev Rev Stat § 178.400 (1989).
11. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1812-13.
12. Id at 1813. Dr. Master testified that he "guess[ed]" that ceasing Riggins' medica-
tion would neither noticeably affect his behavior nor render him incompetent to stand trial.
Id. Dr. Quass agreed that Riggins would be competent to testify without daily dosages of
Mellaril but noted that the effects of Mellaril on Riggins would not be noticeable to the
jurors were medication to be continued. Id. Dr. O'Gorman said that Meflaril made Riggins
calmer and more relaxed and noted that excessive dosages caused drowsiness. Id. Dr.
O'Gorman also questioned the high dosage being administered to Riggins yet declined to
predict Riggins' behavior if administration of Mellaril was discontinued. Id.
13. Id. In his report, Dr. Jurasky stated that it was his opinion that Riggins was
incompetent to stand trial and that without Mellaril, Riggins would "regress to a manifest
psychosis" and be difficult to control. Id.
14. Id. The district court denied the motion by issuing a one-page order which
neither clarified its position nor gave reasons for its decision. Id. As a result, Riggins re-
ceived 800 milligrams of Mellaril daily through the duration of his trial until its completion




knife before taking money, drugs and other items from his home."
A jury found Riggins guilty of murder with a deadly weapon and
robbery with a deadly weapon and sentenced him to death.
7
On his appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court, Riggins contended
that the involuntary administration of Mellaril during his trial ren-
dered him unable to assist in his own defense and unjustifiably
prejudiced his behavior and presentation during the trial. 8 Such
prejudice was unjustified, Riggins claimed, because the State first
failed to demonstrate a need for the drug and then did not explore
possible and less intrusive alternatives to administration of 800
milligrams of Mellaril each day.'9 The Nevada Supreme Court up-
16. Id at 1821 (Thomas dissenting).
17. Id at 1813. Riggins told the jury that he had been using cocaine on the night of
Wade's death and admitted that the two had been fighting. Id. Riggins claimed that Wade
was trying to kill him, and that the voices in his head had told him that killing Wade would
be justifiable homicide. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Cases relied upon by Riggins were, among others, United States v Bryant, 670
F Supp 840 (Minn 1987) and Bee v Greaves, 744 F2d 1387 (10th Cir 1984).
In Bryant, the court determined that both substantive and procedural due process ques-
tions were embodied within the issue of whether the United States was entitled to an order
authorizing forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to a federal prison inmate who
has not been adjudicated incompetent. Bryant, 670 F Supp at 843. In answering the sub-
stantive issue of whether Bryant had a constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic medica-
tion, the court concluded that a protected liberty interest in refusing treatment with anti-
psychotic medication did indeed exist. Id at 844. The court then noted that Bryant's liberty
interest was not absolute and, as such, must be balanced against competing governmental
interests in maintaining security and protecting inmates and staff from violence to deter-
mine whether a violation of his constitutional rights had occurred. Id. In granting the order
authorizing the continuation of forcible administration of antipsychotic medication, the
court concluded that the procedural requirements of due process were satisfied by the pro-
fessional evaluations performed of Bryant's mental state which determined that the treat-
ment was medically appropriate and the fact that less intrusive alternatives were considered
and found unsatisfactory before forcible medication with antipsychotic drugs was continued.
Id at 844-45.
In Bee, a former pretrial detainee filed an action for damages under the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, 42 USC §1983 (1976) claiming that he was forcibly administered antipsychotic med-
ication while detained at the Salt Lake County Jail prior to trial. Bee, 744 F2d at 1389. The
court first addressed the issue of whether a pretrial detainee has a constitutional right to
refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs. Id at 1391. After determining that the decision
whether to accept treatment with antipsychotic drugs was sufficiently important to be in-
cluded within the category of privacy interests protected by the Constitution, the court pro-
ceeded to balance that interest against the competing obligation of the jail to protect its
inmates and staff from a dangerous and violent mentally ill pretrial detainee. Id at 1394-95.
In reversing the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the court held
that less restrictive alternatives such as segregation or the use of less controversial drugs
should have been considered prior to forcibly medicating Bee with antipsychotic drugs. Id at
1396. In addition, the court indicated that a determination should have been made as to
whether an emergency existed such that forcible administration of antipsychotic medication
was required to allow the jail to meet its obligation to protect its inmates and staff. Id at
1395-96.
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held the convictions finding that the expert testimony at trial was
sufficient to advise the jury of Mellaril's effects on Riggins' de-
meanor and testimony."° The court also determined that the dis-
trict court neither abused its discretion nor violated Riggins' trial
rights by denying his motion to terminate administration of
Mellaril.21
Riggins appealed to the United States Supreme Court.2 2 Certio-
rari was granted on the issue of whether rights guaranteed by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments are violated when a criminal
defendant is involuntarily administered antipsychotic medication
during trial.23
Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion of the Court
24
which reversed the convictions on the grounds that the findings of
the trial court were insufficient to properly support the involuntary
administration of Mellaril to Riggins. 25 In addressing Riggins' ar-
20. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1813.
21. Id at 1814. See Riggins v Nevada, 107 Nev 178, 808 P2d 535 (1991). Justice Rose
concurred with the majority but filed a separate opinion because although the record sup-
ported the conclusion that Riggins had received a fair trial and that his appreciation of that
trial was not diminished, he would have preferred the record to show first that Riggins
needed to be on the antipsychotic medication and second, that he could not function with-
out it. Riggins, 808 P2d at 539-40 (Rose concurring). Justice Rose thought that the district
court should have ordered a pretrial suspension of the medication in order to determine
whether it was indeed absolutely necessary. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1814. See Riggins, 808 P2d
at 540 (Rose concurring). The dissent presented by Justice Springer argued that forced ad-
ministration of antipsychotic drugs to a criminal defendant may not be utilized solely to
allow prosecution. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1814. See Riggins, 808 P2d at 541 (Springer dissent-
ing). In his opinion, use of such drugs to bring a defendant to trial resulted in "state mind-
control" and interfered with his right to appear and defend against charges in a criminal
case by altering his emotional and thought processes. Id.
22. Riggins v Nevada, 112 S Ct 49 (1991).
23. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1814. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion states:
[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
US Const, Amend VI.
24. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1812. Justice Kennedy filed a separate opinion concurring in
the judgment. Id at 1817 (Kennedy concurring). Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion
in which Justice Scalia joined except as to Part II-A. Id at 1821 (Thomas dissenting).
25. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1812. In rendering its opinion, the Court adhered to two
presumptions: first, that administration of Mellaril to Riggins was involuntary after the de-
nial by the district court of Riggins' motion to terminate its use; second, that the adminis-
918
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gument that he was denied a full and fair trial as a result of the
forced administration of Mellaril, the Court relied on dictum in
Washington v Harper.2 The Court opined that freedom from in-
voluntary injection of antipsychotic medication was a protected in-
terest under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2  To ensure that this
freedom was not offended, the State must prove both the medical
appropriateness of the drug being administered and the necessity
of that drug once the defendant has moved to terminate its
administration.28
In controverting a point raised by the dissent, the Court denied
that it had adopted strict scrutiny as the standard to be utilized by
the trial court in balancing the pretrial detainee's liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medication with the concerns of the State in
administering that medication.2 9 The Court noted that it had no
occasion to set forth substantive standards for trial courts to apply
tration of Mellaril to Riggins was medically proper. Id at 1814. The Court also declined to
address Riggins' Eighth Amendment claim that he was denied the chance to appear before
jurors in his true medical condition because of the administration of Mellaril on the grounds
that the argument was neither presented to the Nevada Supreme Court nor in Riggins' peti-
tion for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Id.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, "Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
US Const, Amend VIII.
26. 494 US 210 (1990). The defendant in Harper argued that his due process rights
had been violated when the State of Washington and other individuals forced him to take
antipsychotic drugs, including Mellaril, against his will. Harper, 494 US at 217. The Court
determined that the involuntary administration of such drugs was indeed a substantial in-
terference with an individual's liberty, but that due process permits the State to administer
antipsychotic drugs to an unwilling mentally ill inmate where it is determined that the
treatment is both in the inmate's best interest and the inmate is dangerous to himself or
others. Id at 221, 227.
27. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1814. The Court cited Harper and noted that the interfer-
ence from antipsychotic drugs is particularly severe in that although the medication is
designed to beneficially alter the patient's cognitive processes, it also produces serious side
effects, some of which can be fatal. Id. In addition, although Harper related to forced medi-
cation of a prison inmate, the Court concluded that a pretrial detainee such as Riggins must
be afforded the same right to be free of involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs as
a convicted criminal. Id at 1815.
28. Id. Although noting that it had never had, and still did in fact not have, the
occasion to determine substantive standards by which to judge whether forced administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs in trial or pretrial settings had satisfied due process, the Court
indicated that district court could have satisfied due process either by finding that the treat-
ment with Mellaril was medically appropriate and, after considering less intrusive alterna-
tives, necessary for Riggins' or others' safety, or by establishing that less intrusive means
would not allow proper adjudication of the merits of the case. Id. The Court declined to
address the issue of whether a competent criminal defendant may refuse to take the anti-
psychotic medication necessary to maintain his competency for trial. Id.
29. Id at 1815-16.
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because the district court had failed to make any determinations
concerning either the need for continued administration of Mellaril
or the availability of reasonable alternatives.3 0 The Supreme Court
also found that the trial court had failed to address Riggins' inter-
est in freedom from involuntary administration of medication."1
The Court concluded that such failure resulted in error which may
have impaired Riggins' constitutionally protected trial rights.32
In addition, the Court rejected the conclusion presented by the
dissent that the criminal defendant be required to present specific
facts proving how administration of Mellaril adversely impacted
his trial.33 The Court ruled that the presentation by the defense of
expert testimony on the effects of Mellaril was insufficient to cor-
rect the possibility of prejudice by the jury during the trial.34 The
Court also stated that no findings existed to support the possibility
that involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication was
required to accomplish essential state interests.3 5 Thus, the Court
reversed the judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court and re-
manded the case for further proceedings.3 "
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy opined that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs to a criminal defendant for the purpose of en-
suring his competency to stand trial absent an extraordinary show-
ing by the State. 7 He then stated that he doubted such a showing
was possible based on the current understandings of the character-
istics and effects of the antipsychotic drugs.38
In agreeing with the majority that an individual who received
medication against his will for the purpose of standing trial may
challenge his conviction on a constitutional basis, Justice Kennedy
30. Id at 1816. The Court indicated that the only conclusion it could draw as to the
reasoning behind the district court's denial of Riggins' motion to terminate medication was
that the trial court had used a balancing test to weigh the risk of prejudice to the defense by
alterations in Riggins' attitude and demeanor caused by the medication against the possibil-
ity of Riggins' subsequent incompetence were he taken off of the medication. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The side effects of the drug may have affected Riggins' attitude during trial as
well as his ability to comprehend and participate in the proceedings to a sufficient extent
such that his defense was prejudiced. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id at 1817. The Court noted that essential state policy may sometimes be used to
justify possible prejudice, such as cases in which it is necessary to control a disruptive de-
fendant. Id at 1816-17.
36. Id at 1817.




rejected the dissent's argument that Riggins' contentions revolved
around the admissibility of evidence under Nevada law and thus
was not reviewable by the Supreme Court except under limited cir-
cumstances. 9 Instead, Justice Kennedy likened the involuntary
administration of antipsychotic medication to manipulation of evi-
dence by the prosecution and, as such, within the purview of the
Court's power to review.40 Moreover, the State's interest in restor-
ing criminal defendants' competency was legitimate as the major-
ity of rights considered necessary for a full and fair trial depend
upon it.41
Justice Kennedy felt that the primary question left unanswered
by the Court's opinion was whether the State may be allowed to
ensure the competence of the defendant through the involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs based on its legitimate inter-
est in conducting a proper trial.42 In his opinion, competence to
stand trial was the basis for those rights which are essential for a
fair trial.43 Justice Kennedy opined that competence to stand trial
was so basic and so important that a general rule permitting
waiver of that right would not withstand scrutiny under the Due
Process Clause.44
Justice Kennedy's concerns about the use of antipsychotic medi-
cation in a trial setting included the possibility of prejudice by the
jury because of the defendant's altered demeanor, impairment of
the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel if he cannot




42. Id at 1818. Justice Kennedy forgave the Court for not addressing this issue by
noting that it was the subject of neither the brief nor the argument before the Court. Id. He
then proceeded to analyze it himself in order to express his reservations concerning the
propriety of involuntary medication for the purpose of ensuring a criminal defendant's com-
petency to stand trial. Id.
43. Id. Included in those rights are the rights to effective assistance of counsel; to
summon, confront and cross-examine witnesses; to testify on one's own behalf; and to re-
main silent without penalty for doing so. Id. See Drope v Missouri, 420 US 162, 171-72
(1975). "Competency to stand trial" is defined as the capacity required of a criminal defend-
ant to understand the nature and object of the proceedings, to consult with counsel, and to
assist in preparing.his or her defense. Black's Law Dictionary 283-84 (West, 6th ed 1990).
Conviction of an incompetent criminal defendant has been determined to violate due pro-
cess, thus the State cannot put a defendant on trial unless he is competent. Riggins, 112 S
Ct at 1817. See Pate v Robinson, 383 US 375 (1966).
44. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1817. Justice Kennedy noted that the issue of waiver of the
right of competence to stand trial was not currently before the Court. Id.
1993
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fendant's right to testify on his own behalf. 4" As such, he deter-
mined that the State must be required in all cases to prove that no
significant risk existed that such drugs would materially alter or
impair the defendant's ability either to react to trial testimony or
assist counsel in his defense." If this showing could not be made
and the State could not render the defendant competent without
utilizing involuntary medication, then civil commitment was re-
quired in order to preserve the integrity of the trial process as re-
quired by the Constitution.47
The dissent, written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justice
Scalia except as to Part II-A, agreed with the Nevada Supreme
Court that Riggins received a full and fair trial as required by the
Constitution.8 He believed that this case revolved around the ad-
missibility of certain types of demeanor evidence into trial under
Nevada law rather than the possible deprivation of constitutional
rights, and as such, the Court should only have conducted a lim-
ited review to determine whether the evidentiary ruling was so un-
fair as to deny due process to the defendant." In his opinion, the
fact that the trial court refused to allow Riggins to introduce his
unmedicated mental condition as evidence did not deny him a full
45. Id at 1819-20. Justice Kennedy noted that the right to testify on one's own behalf
is implicit in the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Id. The Compulsory
Process Clause states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense." US Const, Amend VI.
46. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1818. Justice Kennedy further underscored his misgivings
concerning the ability of the State to make such a showing by delineating the primary and
side effects of the antipsychotic drugs. Id. The side effects, in his opinion, were the main
concern in that they could result in prejudice to the defendant's case either by altering his
demeanor to affect his reactions and testimony during trial, or by causing him to be unable
or unwilling to aid counsel in his defense. Id at 1819. The importance of the defendant's
behavior is manifest in that he is before the trier of fact who is observing and judging his
reactions during all stages of the proceedings. Id. The documented side effects of Mellaril, in
particular drowsiness, depression and lack of alertness, could result in significant prejudice
to the defendant both during the trial and during sentencing, as they inhibit his ability to
react and respond to the proceedings. Id.
47. Id at 1820. "Civil commitment" is defined as a form of confinement order used in
the civil context for those who are mentally ill, incompetent, alcoholic, drug addicted, etc. as
contrasted with the criminal commitment of a sentence. Black's Law Dictionary 245 (West,
6th ed 1990).
48. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1821 (Thomas dissenting).
49. Id. Thomas cited Estelle v McGuire, 112 S Ct 475 (1992), in which the Court
determined that the Supreme Court could not reverse a state court's criminal conviction
based on the possibility of a trial judge's improper admission of evidence unless the evi-
dence ruling so infected the trial procedures that the resulting conviction could be a viola-
tion of due process. Estelle, 112 S Ct at 482. The Due Process Clause does not allow federal
courts to engage in a detailed review into the wisdom of state evidentiary rules. Id.
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and fair trial.50 Justice Thomas further berated the Court for first
raising the constitutional issues and then failing to delineate how
Riggins' trial had been rendered unfair by the effects of the
medication. 1
The trial court allowed Riggins to present testimony concerning
his mental state at the time of the crime rather than appear in
court in an unmedicated condition.2 In Justice Thomas' opinion,
the fact the Riggins was allowed to show the effects of the medica-
tion on his mental condition by expert testimony alone did not
cause his trial to be fundamentally unfair.5 Justice Thomas con-
cluded that the mere possibility that the drug's side effects may
have impacted Riggins' trial testimony and assistance to counsel
was insufficient to support a conclusion that the trial was not
fair.54 Riggins was specifically found to be competent to stand trial
while taking Mellaril, and during trial he failed to present any evi-
dence to the contrary. 5 This competence, Justice Thomas con-
cluded, confirmed that Riggins received a full and fair trial.56
Justice Thomas further disagreed with the majority's opinion
that the holding in Harper warranted reversal of Riggins' convic-
tion.57 He distinguished the instant facts by noting that Riggins
began taking Mellaril voluntarily after complaining about hearing
voices and being unable to sleep.58 He also noted that, although
the district court denied Riggins' motion to order termination of
medication, neither did it affirmatively order him to accept the
50. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1822. Justice Thomas noted that at least one psychiatrist
had opined that Riggins' demeanor would not noticeably change were medicatibn ceased. Id.
He then chastised the Court for not explaining why, even if the drug did affect Riggins'
demeanor, those effects caused his trial to be fundamentally unfair. Id.
51. Id at 1822.
52. Id.
53. Id. Several state courts have held that expert testimony is sufficient to explain
effects of antipsychotic medication on the attitude and demeanor of a criminal defendant
during trial. Id. See State v Law, 270 SC 664, 673, 244 SE2d 302, 306 (1978); and State v
Jojola, 89 NM 489, 493, 553 P2d 1296, 1300 (1976).
54. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1822. Justice Thomas further noted that the trial court had
found Riggins to be competent to stand trial under Nev Rev Stat § 178.400 while taking
Mellaril, and that Riggins had not contended that due process required a higher standard.
Id at 1823.
55. Id at 1822-23. Riggins failed to produce specific facts to support his claim of in-
ability to participate in his defense, to state how he would have directed the conduct of his







drugs.5 9 Thus he would not have been in violation of a court order
had he simply refused to take the medication. 0 Justice Thomas
believed that the Court had improperly presumed that the medica-
tion was forced on Riggins during the course of the trial. 1 Justice
Thomas contended that the Court should not have addressed the
issue of Riggins' deprivation of his liberty interest because that is-
sue was not raised before the Nevada Supreme Court and thus was
not within the Court's power of review.2 He further distinguished
Harper in that the defendant in that case sought only civil reme-
dies such as injunction and damages whereas Riggins' sought re-
versal of a criminal conviction. 3 Finally, Justice Thomas con-
cluded that in its majority opinion, the Court adopted a standard
of strict scrutiny under which trial courts would forthwith be re-
quired to balance the pretrial detainee's liberty interest against the
State's interests; thus, either changing the reasonableness standard
promulgated by Harper or adopting a separate standard for pre-
trial detainees without explaining its rationale."
As noted by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion, the use
of antipsychotic drugs to treat mental illness is a relatively recent
phenomenon.6 5 Introduced in the early 1950's, these drugs were
found to be extremely effective in temporarily reducing or even
eliminating overt symptoms of certain forms of mental illness, par-
ticularly schizophrenia. 6




63. Id at 1825. The United States Supreme Court traditionally has reversed criminal
convictions based on only two kinds of constitutional deprivation: first, when the depriva-
tion occurs during the presentation of the case to the trier of fact and second, when the
deprivation results in a structural defect affecting the framework of the trial. Id. See Ari-
zona v Fulminante, 111 S Ct 1246 (1991), rehearing denied 111 S Ct 2067 (1991). Justice
Thomas condemned the Court for failing to explain how Riggins' arguments fell under ei-
ther of these situations. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1825. Furthermore, Justice Thomas noted that
in Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501 (1976), the Court had followed lower courts' decisions in
finding that actual prejudice, as contrasted with the mere possibility of prejudice, was re-
quired for a criminal conviction to be reversed by the Supreme Court on grounds that the
defendant did not receive a fair trial. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1825.
64. Id at 1826.
65. Id at 1817.
66. Linda C. Fentiman, Whose Right Is It Anyway?: Rethinking Competency to
Stand Trial in Light of the Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U Miami L Rev
1109, 1110 n 2 (1986). Antipsychotic drugs are broken into five major sub-groups: the pheno-
thiazines, the thioxanthines, the rauwolfia derivatives, the benzoquinolines, and the
butyrophenes. Fentiman, 40 U Miami L Rev at 1110 n 2. While positive effects include the
reduction of psychotic symptoms, use of these drugs is accompanied by serious and poten-
Vol. 31:915
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The first state courts to deal with use of these drugs struggled
with the nature of the effects on the medicated individual's compe-
tency to stand trial.67 In State v Hampton,68 the court found the
fact that legal competency was induced by antipsychotic medica-
tion to be of no legal consequence, and thus held that the State
had no interest in preventing the trial of an artificially competent
criminal defendant.
69
Subsequent state courts opined that the criminal defendant re-
tained only a limited right of freedom from state interference with
his mental processes during trial.70 These courts believed that this
right was only violated when the state-administered medication in-
terfered with the defendant's cognitive processes.71 As such, they
categorized the effects of the antipsychotic drugs as diminishing
the defendant's comprehension, memory, ability to communicate
effectively and to confer with counsel, or ability to function
rationally.7
Only one state court directly addressed the effects of the drugs
on the entire range of the defendant's mental activity.73 In Mary-
tially irreversible side effects. Id. The muscular side effects include dystonic reactions (mus-
cle spasms, especially in the facial area and arms, irregular flexing, writhing or grimacing
movements, protrusion of the tongue); akathesis (restlessness, agitation, inability to stay
still); parkinsonisms (muscle stiffness or rigidity, mask-like face, tremors, shuffling gait,
drooling); and tardive dyskinesia (involuntary motor movements, particularly in the oral
area; this side effect is considered one of the most serious as it has resisted curative efforts
and may persist for years even after medication has ceased). Robert Plotkin, Limiting the
Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw U L Rev 461, 475
(1977). Nonmuscular side effects include, but are not limited to, drowsiness, weakness, dizzi-
ness, fainting, low blood pressure, frigidity, depression, skin changes, ocular changes and
cardiovascular changes. Plotkin, 72 Nw U L Rev at 476. A few cases of sudden death have
also been documented. Id.
67. See note 43 and accompanying text.
68. 253 La 399, 218 S2d 311 (1969).
69. Hampton, 218 S2d at 312. An unfit defendant requested to be allowed to stand
trial while being treated with the antipsychotic drug, Thorazine. Id. A state sanity commis-
sion determined that she was competent while under treatment and allowed the trial to
continue. Id. Thus the proposition was established that the court would look only at existing
competency regardless of whether it was synthetically produced by the use of medication.
Id.
70. Comment, Antipsychotic Drugs and Fitness to Stand Trial: The Right of the
Unfit Accused to Refuse Treatment, 52 U Chi L Rev 773, 778 (1985). This right was vari-
ously located in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Jojola, 553 P2d
1296 (cited in note 53); provisions of state constitutions, see State v Murphy, 56 Wash2d
761, 355 P2d 323 (1960); or judicially created, see Commonwealth v Louraine, 453 NE2d 437
(Mass 1983); and State v Hayes, 118 NH 458, 389 A2d 1379 (1978).
71. Comment, Antipsychotic Drugs and Fitness to Stand Trial, 52 U Chi L Rev at
778 (cited in note 70).
72. Id.
73. Id at 779.
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ott, the Washington Court of Appeals found that the defendant's
right to "exclusive control of his mental processes" during trial was
violated because he received medication which made him dull, list-
less and unwilling to assist in his defense."4
Federal courts first addressed the issues presented by the use of
antipsychotic drugs in the landmark case of Rennie v Klein.75 The
primary issues confronting the court were (1) whether an involun-
tarily committed inmate in a state mental institution retained a
substantive constitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsy-
chotic drugs, and (2) if such a right did exist, what procedural re-
quirements were necessary to satisfy due process. 7 The court de-
termined that such a right did indeed exist and that the informal
administrative procedures utilized by the State met the due pro-
cess requirements.77
In analyzing the first issue, the court divided the question into
three inquiries: (1) was a liberty interest created by state law
which was infringed by forced administration of antipsychotic
medication to involuntarily committed mental patients; (2) if not,
was such a liberty interest created by the Constitution; (3) if so,
what are the substantive contours of this interest.78 Although an-
swering the first inquiry in the negative, the court did find that
74. State v Maryott, 6 Wash App 96, 492 P2d 239 (1971). This case addressed the
issue of whether the state had the right to administer mind-affecting medication (sparine,
librium and chloral hydrate) to a criminal defendant against his will during trial. Maryott,
492 P2d at 240. In reversing the defendant's conviction and remanding the case for a new
trial, the court held that due process required that, at a minimum, the defendant be able to
confront witnesses against him, offer testimony, and be represented by counsel. Id at 242.
The court further stated that when mental competence is at issue, the defendant's de-
meanor is especially important. Id. As such, the possibility of prejudice by the jury due to
the effects of the medication on the defendant's demeanor was not sufficiently alleviated by
the presentation of mere testimony as to either those effects or to the defendant's demeanor
at the time the alleged crime was committed. Id. The Maryott court also addressed the
effect of the unwanted medication on the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights of
confrontation and presence and noted that such rights must be balanced against legitimate
state interests. Id at 243. The court opined that the state probably had no legitimate inter-
est in medicating a defendant involuntarily. Id.
75. 653 F2d 836 (3d Cir 1981). John Rennie was an involuntarily committed patient
in a state mental institution. Rennie, 653 F2d at 838. He was administered antipsychotic
drugs against his will on numerous occasions. Id. He originally brought suit in district court
alleging numerous constitutional violations. He later amended his complaint to assert a class
action. Argument in the Court of Appeals was limited to the motions filed for preliminary
injunctions with respect to the right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic medication. Id
at 838-39.
76. Id at 841.
77. Id at 838.
78. Id at 841.
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such a liberty interest was created by the United States Constitu-
tion.7 9 The court stated that an individual's liberty may be dimin-
ished upon involuntary civil commitment only to the extent re-
quired to allow for confinement by the state to prevent the
individual from harming either himself or others.8 0 After reviewing
the impact of side effects of the drugs on individuals receiving
them and determining that the risks created represented diminish-
ments of the individual's confinement conditions, the court held
that involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs represented
an unjustified intrusion on the individual's personal security. 1
This intrusion was deemed significant enough to rise to the level of
a liberty interest entitled to protection under the Due Process
Clause.2
In considering the scope of this interest, the Rennie court noted
that the right was not absolute, but instead must be considered in
light of legitimate governmental concerns and obligations.8 3 The
court noted that the state's power to confine had been justified
under both the state police power and the parens patriae theory,
with the two often overlapping.8' These same sources were also the
justification for involuntary administration of medication to these
individuals. 5 However, the court stated that the liberty depriva-
tion imposed by the state was limited to that required to provide
necessary care or to address legitimate administrative concerns. 6
Thus, the court required that the "least intrusive means" standard
be implemented during the balancing analysis. 7 As such, the
79. Id at 843.
80. Id.
81. Id at 843-44.
82. Id at 844.
83. Id at 845.
84. Id. "Police power" is the authority conferred upon the individual states by the
Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; it is the power of the State to place
restraints on personal freedom and individual property rights for the protection of public
health, safety and morals or the promotion of public convenience and general prosperity.
Black's Law Dictionary 1156 (West, 6th ed 1990). "Parens patriae" refers to the role of
state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability; the theory originated from
the English common law under which the King had a royal prerogative to act as guardian to
individuals with legal disabilities, i.e. infants. Black's Law Dictionary 1114 (West, 6th ed
1990).
The Tenth Amendment states, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." US Const, Amend X.
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means chosen to promote the state's substantial concerns must be
tailored such that minimal infringement of the individual's liberty
interests results.88
Finally, the court addressed the second issue concerning whether
procedural requirements necessary to satisfy due process had been
implemented. 9 In finding that the informal procedures established
by the State sufficiently met the procedural requirements of due
process and that a judicial hearing was not necessary before a pa-
tient could be involuntarily medicated with antipsychotic drugs,
the court modified the lower court's order and remanded the case
for further proceedings.9 0
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the decision was
vacated and the case remanded for consideration in light of the
Supreme Court decision in Youngberg v Romeo.91 The Rennie
court interpreted the holding in Youngberg to reject the "least in-
trusive means" standard and adopted the "professional judgment"
standard for determining whether the individual's liberty interest
had been properly safeguarded.92 However, the court upheld its
88. Id at 846. The court further stated that the least intrusive means standard did
not prohibit all intrusions, but only required a balancing of the individual's interest in not
receiving treatment with those of the state in administering the antipsychotic medication to
that individual. Id at 847. A balance must be struck between "efficacy and intrusiveness."
Id.
89. Id. The court listed three factors which must be considered in the balancing anal-
ysis: (1) the private interest, (2) the risk of erroneous decision through procedures used and
the value of any additional or substituted safeguards, and (3) the governmental interest. Id
at 848.
90. Id at 851. The New Jersey procedures were as follows:
(1) When the patient initially refuses treatment, the treating doctor must explain the
nature of his condition, the rationale for using the particular medication, the risks
and benefits of that medication and possible alternate treatments to the patient.
(2) If the patient still refuse treatment, the patient's treatment team convenes a
meeting to discuss the situation at which the patient has a right to be present.
(3) If no solution is reached at the meeting, the medical director of the hospital or his
designee must examine the patient and his record; medication may be administered if
the director agrees with the treating physician's assessment of the situation.
(4) The medical director is authorized but not required to retain an independent psy-
chiatrist to evaluate the patient's need for medication.
(5) The director is required to make weekly evaluations of the treatment program of
each patient currently receiving medication involuntarily to determine if the need for
forced medication still exists.
(6) In addition, all cases of involuntary medication were being reviewed by a division
director or another physician in the Division of Mental Health and Hospitals central
office; this last procedure was not required by state statutes.
Id at 848-49.
91. 457 US 307 (1982). See Rennie v Klein, 458 US 1119 (1982).
92. Rennie v Klein, 720 F2d 266, 269 (3d Cir 1983). Youngberg dealt with the issue of
whether a mentally retarded individual retained constitutional rights to be safe and free
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earlier decision and only modified the reasoning behind it 53 The
court extended the liberty interest identified in Youngberg, that of
freedom from bodily restraints, to support its earlier conclusion
that Rennie retained a liberty interest in freedom from the chemi-
cal restraints of antipsychotic medication."' Application of the
"professional judgment" standard resulted in the holding that an-
tipsychotic drugs may be forcibly administered to an involuntarily
committed mental patient when such an action is deemed neces-
sary based on professional judgment to prevent the patient from
harming himself or others.
9 5
After the Third Circuit's initial decision in Rennie, but prior to
its reconsideration based on Youngberg, Mills v Rogers96 was de-
cided in the United States Supreme Court.9 7 The Court, however,
declined to address the issue of whether involuntarily committed
mental patients have a constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic
medication by stating that it would be inappropriate for the Court
to address possible Constitutional issues when a complete disposi-
tion had not been made concerning the applicability of state law to
the issue.98 In its analysis though, the Court did recognize that the
drugs were "mind-altering"99 and that the issue involved both sub-
stantive and procedural aspects. 100 Furthermore, the Court noted
that -both parties had conceded the existence of a constitutional
right to refuse administration of antipsychotic medication. 0 ' The
Court indicated that the substantive issue concerned definition of
from physical restraints after he is involuntarily committed to a mental institution.
Youngberg, 457 US at 309. The Court held that such a liberty interest did exist, and that
the test for determining whether the state had properly safeguarded that interest was
whether professional judgment had been exercised by the medical professionals. Id at 319,
322-24. The Court also determined that the judgment of the medical professionals was to be
considered presumptively valid. Id.
93. Rennie, 720 F2d at 269.
94. Id at 271.
95. Id at 269. The court then found that the procedures provided for adequate pro-
fessional judgment such that the requirements for due process as promulgated by the Su-
preme Court in Youngberg were satisfied. Id at 270.
96. 457 US 291 (1982).
97. Rogers and six others filed suit against various officials and staff of Boston State
Hospital alleging that the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs while they were
involuntarily committed patients of the hospital violated their constitutional rights. Rogers,
457 US at 293-94. They sought compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive
relief. Id at 294.
98. Id at 293, 305-06.
99. Id at 293 n 1.
100. Id at 299.
101. Id.
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that constitutional interest and the competing state interests
which might outweigh it, whereas the procedural issue related to
the minimum requirements under the Constitution necessary to
protect that constitutional interest.10 2 Thus, the Supreme Court
laid the groundwork for subsequent decisions in the lower federal
courts which defined the liberty interest and established proce-
dural guidelines to ensure its protection.'
In 1984, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit expanded
the liberty interest to be free from unwanted antipsychotic medi-
cation to include pretrial detainees.104 In Bee, the threshold issue
before the court was whether a pretrial detainee retained a right
under the Constitution to refuse treatment with antipsychotic
medication. 10 5 In holding that the pretrial detainee did have such a
right, the Court determined that the right to be free from un-
wanted medication was grounded in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth' Amendment, and right of Freedom of Speech in the
First Amendment.106 The court extended this liberty interest to
pretrial detainees by beginning its analysis with the recognition
102. Id. Thus the Court addressed the issues and identified the Constitutional right,
but determined that reference to state law was required before further consideration could
be given under Constitutional guidelines. Id.
103. See, for example, Project Release v Prevost, 722 F2d 960 (2d Cir 1983); Johnson
v Silvers, 742 F2d 823 (4th Cir 1984); Walters v Western State Hospital, 864 F2d 695 (10th
Cir 1988).
104. Bee v Greaves, 744 F2d 1387 (10th Cir 1984), cert denied 469 US 1214 (1985).
Four days after Bee was arrested, the jail staff at the Salt Lake City Jail referred him to the
mental health staff because he was hallucinating. Bee, 744 F2d at 1389. Bee complained that
he was not receiving Thorazine, an antipsychotic drug, and threatened to commit suicide if
the medication was not given to him. Id. Bee took the Thorazine voluntarily for almost two
months, including during a competency hearing at which he was found to be competent to
stand trial. Id. The court ordered Bee medicated with Thorazine each night. Id. Bee began
complaining that he was having problems with the drug and finally refused treatment for
five days. Id. The jail psychiatrist determined that Bee's condition was deteriorating, and
order him to be forcibly medicated if he refused. Id at 1390. Bee was given shots of
Thorazine rather than the usual oral dosage until he cooperated and took the oral dose
without force. Id. The record was unclear as the whether Bee was violent or not during the
time he was not receiving the Thorazine. Id. It was also unclear whether the order to forci-
bly medicate was indefinite or for limited duration only. Id. Bee filed an action for damages
claiming a violation of his constitutional rights to refuse treatment. Id at 1388.
105. Id at 1391.
106. Id at 1393-94. The liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clause was
the right to be free from unjustified intrusions on personal security. Id at 1393. In its analy-
sis the court cited Youngberg, 457 US at 316. The protected First Amendment right was the
protection of the capacity to produce ideas which the court found based in the right to
communicate ideas. Bee, 744 F2d at 1393-94.
The First Amendment states in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law ... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech .. " US Const, Amend I.
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that pretrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes,
retain at least those rights enjoyed by convicted prisoners. 10 7 In-
cluded in those rights are certain freedoms under both the First
and Fourteenth Amendments."0 8
The court then proceeded to limit these rights by noting that
they must be considered in light of substantial state concerns. 0 9
The court indicated that the jail's duty to protect its inmates and
staff from a violent pretrial detainee was a legitimate interest
which must be balanced against the constitutional rights of the
pretrial detainee. 10 The court applied the "professional judgment"
standard pronounced in Youngberg to state that "determining
whether an emergency exists sufficient to warrant involuntary ad-
ministration of antipsychotic medication requires a professional
evaluation of all relevant circumstances of the case." ' After dis-
tinguishing Youngberg, the court also brought in the "least intru-
sive means" standard when it noted that the availability of less
restrictive alternatives to the forced medication should also be con-
sidered.112 Finally, the court reversed the lower court's summary
judgment in favor of the defendant and remanded the case for fur-
ther consideration."1
3
The next cases involving the use of antipsychotic drugs ad-
dressed the rights of federal prison inmates to refuse the treat-
ment. In United States v Bryant"' and the consolidated cases of
107. Bee, 744 F2d at 1391.
108. Id. The court cited Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520, 545 (1979), in support for this
analysis. Bee, 744 F2d at 1391.
109. Id at 1394. The court delineated the three concerns argued by the defendants: (1)
the obligation of the jail to treat a mentally ill pretrial detainee, (2) the jail's interest in
maintaining the pretrial detainee's competency to stand trial, and (3) the jail's obligation to
maintain security and prevent injury to the detainee as well as other inmates and staff. Id.
The court ruled that the first two interests were not legitimate concerns in this case. Id at
1395.
110. Id.
111. Id at 1396.
112. Id. The court distinguished Youngberg by noting that physical restraints do not
have the same potential of long-term effects as "mental restraints." Id. In stating its opinion
that the state must consider less restrictive alternatives before forcibly medicating the pre-
trial detainee, the court phrased the issue to require consideration of whether an emergency
exists sufficient to justify the state injecting a potentially dangerous drug into a pretrial
detainee who has not been declared mentally incompetent. Id.
113. Id. The lower court was instructed to find whether a sufficient emergency in fact
did exist, and whether forcible medication was the proper response. Id.
114. 670 F Supp 840 (Minn 1987). Bryant was an inmate in the federal prison system
and had been diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. Bryant, 670 F Supp at
842. He was prescribed Haldol, an antipsychotic drug, by a staff psychiatrist, but refused to
take it after suffering certain side effects. Id. He was transferred from the prison to a mental
1993
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United States v Watson and United States v Holmes,11 the
courts addressed the issue of whether federal prisoners retain con-
stitutional rights to refuse antipsychotic medication.1 " Both courts
analogized the Youngberg decision to the present situation and
found that the prisoners retained a liberty interest in freedom
from unwanted antipsychotic medication despite the fact that they
were convicted federal prisoners.1 7 The courts limited this right by
applying the "professional judgment" standard to require a deter-
mination by prison officials and/or medical professionals on
whether medication is necessary to meet substantial state interests,
such as the protection of prison inmates and staff. 1 8 The Watson
and Holmes court reversed the order allowing forced medication of
Holmes and remanded for a determination of whether he could
health facility where he refused to eat, went into seclusion, threatened a staff member, as-
saulted an unidentified person, and set fire to his cell. Id. A staff psychiatrist and staff
psychologist concluded that Bryant was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and opined
that seclusion and other forms of treatment would not be beneficial without antipsychotic
medication. Id. The United States filed a petition pursuant to 18 USC § 4245 to allow forced
administration of antipsychotic medication. The magistrate found that Bryant was suffering
from mental illness which required care and treatment, but stated that forcible administra-
tion of antipsychotic medication was improper absent an emergency or adjudication of in-
competency. Id at 841.
Section 4245 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Motion to determine present mental condition of imprisoned person.-If a person
serving a sentence of imprisonment objects either in writing or through his attorney
to being transferred to a suitable facility for care or treatment, an attorney for the
government. may file a motion. . . for a hearing on the present mental condition
of the person ..
(d) Determination and disposition.-If, after the hearing, the court finds by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the person is suffering from a mental disease or defect
for the treatment of which he is in need of custody for care or treatment in a suitable
facility, the court shall commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General.
The Attorney General shall hospitalize the person for treatment in a suitable facility
until he is no longer in need of such custody for care or treatment.
18 USC § 4245 (1982).
115. 893 F2d 970 (8th Cir 1990). The facts in Holmes' case are similar to those in
Bryant's case, see note 114 and accompanying text. Holmes was diagnosed as suffering from
paranoid schizophrenia and was transferred from prison to a state mental hospital. Watson
and Holmes, 893 F2d at 972-73. He refused treatment with antipsychotic medication, al-
though he was not considered violent or disruptive, and the United States filed a petition to
determine his mental condition pursuant to 18 USC § 4245. Id. The district court upheld
involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs stating that the decision to do so was
neither "arbitrary or capricious." Id at 974.
The fact pattern underlying the Watson case follows the same pattern with the exception
that Watson had committed several acts of violence while in prison. Id at 974-75.
116. Bryant, 670 F Supp at 843. Watson and Holmes, 893 F2d at 971.
117. Bryant, 670 F Supp at 843-44. Watson and Holmes, 893 F2d at 979.
118. Bryant, 670 F Supp at 844. Watson and Holmes, 893 F2d at 979-80.
932
1993 Recent Decisions
function in the general prison population without the drugs.119 The
same court affirmed the order allowing forcible medication of Wat-
son because prison officials had exercised their judgment and de-
termined that Watson could not function without medication in
the general prison population. 120
The Bryant court found that Bryant was suffering from mental
disease or defect which required commitment for proper care and
treatment, and granted the order requesting permission for invol-
untary administration of antipsychotic medication because a pro-
fessional judgment was made by officials at the state facility that
the medication was necessary for effective treatment and the safety
of inmates and staff.
12
1
The issues concerning antipsychotic medication were finally ad-
dressed by the United States Supreme Court in Washington v
Harper.122 The Court spent little time in coming to the conclusion
119. Watson and Holmes, 893 F2d at 982.
120. Id.
121. Bryant, 670 F Supp 844-45.
122. 494 US 210 (1990). Harper was incarcerated in the mental health unit of a state
prison. Harper, 494 US at 213. During that time he voluntarily received antipsychotic medi-
cation. Id. While on parole, which was conditioned on the continuation of his treatment,
Harper was civilly committed to a state hospital. Id at 214. At the hospital he assaulted two
nurses and his parole was revoked. Id. Upon his return to prison, Harper was sent to a
correctional institute established to diagnose and treat convicted felons with serious mental
disorders. Id. He was diagnosed as suffering from manic-depressive disorder, which was later
changed to schizophrenia, and given antipsychotic medication with his consent. Id. After he
refused treatment with the prescribed antipsychotic drugs, the treating physician sought to
medicate him pursuant to a written institute policy which includes both substantive and
procedural rights for the inmate. Id. Involuntary medication with antipsychotic drugs was
prescribed and upheld on appeal. Id at 217. Harper was returned to the prison where he
took no medication, as a result of which his condition deteriorated. Id. He was subject to
another review pursuant to the policy and involuntary medication with antipsychotic drugs
was again upheld subject to periodic reviews. Id. Harper filed suit in 1985 alleging that the
forced administration of antipsychotic medication violated his constitutional rights and re-
questing relief in the form of damages, declaratory and injunctive relief. Id.
This substantive part of the policy allows involuntary treatment with antipsychotic medi-
cation only if the inmate suffers from a mental disorder as defined in the policy, and is
"gravely disabled" or poses a serious threat of harm to himself, others or their property. Id
at 215. Only a psychiatrist may order or approve the medication. The policy also provides
the inmate with a hearing before a special committee, none of the members of which may be
currently involved in his treatment or diagnosis. Id. If the committee decides by a majority
that the inmate is suffering from a mental disorder and is either gravely disabled or a threat
to himself or others, and the independent psychiatrist is in the majority, then the inmate
may be involuntarily medicated. Id at 215-16.
The procedural rights embodied in the policy include the right of the inmate to receive 24
hours notice before the hearing, during which time he may not be medicated, his right to
attend, present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and the right to have a lay advisor versed
in the psychiatric issues involved. Id at 216. The inmate has a right to know the tentative
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that federal prison inmates possess a significant liberty interest in
avoiding unwanted treatment with antipsychotic medication under
the Due Process Clause. 123 However, the Court recognized the ne-
cessity of balancing this liberty interest with those of the state by
noting that the extent of the federal prison inmate's right must be
"defined in the context of his confinement. ' 124 In concluding that
the Policy promulgated by the State met the procedural require-
ments of the Due Process Clause, the Court established a standard
by which such regulations must be reviewed.125 The Court opined
that, when a prison regulation encroaches upon an inmate's consti-
tutional interests, the regulation is valid only if found to be reason-
ably related to legitimate prison interests with consideration given
to the following factors: (1) whether.a valid, rational connection
exists between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmen-
tal interest put forth as justification, (2) the impact that allowing
the constitutional interest to prevail would have on prison inmates,
staff, and the allocation of prison resources, and (3) the absence or
availability of ready alternatives. 2 ' The Court established the rule
that the Due Process Clause allowed involuntary treatment with
antipsychotic medication by the State in cases in which the inmate
was dangerous to himself or others and the treatment was medi-
cally appropriate. 27 Finally, the Court established that the in-
mate's medical and liberty interests may be better served by al-
lowing the above determinations to be made by medical
professionals using "traditional, medical investigative techniques"
rather than by a judge during a judicial hearing.2 s
Riggins presented the Court with the opportunity to determine
first, whether a pretrial detainee retained a protected liberty inter-
est in refusing unwanted antipsychotic medication; second, if such
diagnosis and the factual basis for that diagnosis. Id. He has the right to appeal the commit-
tee's decision to the Superintendent of the Center, and the Superintendent must decide the
appeal within 24 hours after receipt. Id. The inmate may also seek judicial review of the
committee decision in state court. Id. Finally involuntary medication can continue only with
an initial review by another committee after seven days, with reports being prepared by the
treating psychiatrist every 14 days thereafter. Id.
123. Id at 221-22. The Court included a citation to Youngberg in support for its deter-
mination. Id at 222.
124. Id.
125. Id at 223.
126. Id at 224-25.
127. Id at 227.
128. Id at 231. The Court also noted that requiring judicial hearings in all cases would
require significant use of prison resources which would be better put to use caring for the
inmates themselves. Id at 232.
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a liberty interest did exist, the substantive and procedural due pro-
cess analyses necessary to protect that interest; and third, the ef-
fect of a deprivation of that liberty interest on the pretrial de-
tainee's Sixth Amendment rights to a full and fair trial.12 After
addressing the first issue in some detail and concluding that the
liberty interest did indeed exist, the Court declined to address the
substantive and procedural due process aspects of the case by stat-
ing that those issues were not properly before the Court. However,
the fact that the Court held that Riggins did have a liberty interest
of which he had been deprived necessitated that the Court deter-
mine the circumstances under which such a deprivation was ac-
ceptable based upon the dictates of substantive and procedural
due process. The Court's failure to do so makes it necessary for
another case to make its way through the legal system utilizing the
limited resources of the judiciary to decide these issues at a later
date.
In finding that Riggins did retain a liberty interest in freedom
from unwanted antipsychotic medication, the Court determined
that once Riggins moved to terminate medication, the State be-
came obligated to prove both the need and medical appropriate-
ness of the drug.130 However, the Court declined to address the
standard under substantive due process to be applied in balancing
Riggins' liberty interest with possible legitimate state interests. s1 3
The Court hypothesized in dicta concerning actions the State
might have taken under the circumstances which would have met
due process requirements, but did not give any reliable guidance.13
In doing so, the Court appeared to be adopting the standard of
strict scrutiny, but then denied this in the face of an accusation by
the dissent.33 Thus trial courts must choose between applying
129. Substantive due process is defined as the guarantee under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution that no person shall be arbitrarily
deprived of life, liberty of property. Black's Law Dictionary 1429 (West, 6th ed 1990). Pro-
cedural due process encompasses the guarantee of procedural fairness which flows from
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and requires that the party whose rights are to be af-
fected must receive notice and have an opportunity to be heard. Black's Law Dictionary
1203 (West, 6th ed 1990).
130. Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1815.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. See dissent at 1826. As the dissent notes, the Court uses such words as "com-
pelling," "essential" and "obligated" to describe the state's interests which must be bal-
anced agaist Riggins' liberty interest. Id. Strict scrutiny is the standard by which possible
deprivation of an individual's fundamental rights may be judged and requires the state to
establish that it has a compelling interest which justifies the action and that such action is
1993
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what seems to be something slightly less than a strict scrutiny
standard, or applying the "rational basis" standard upheld in
Harper in determining whether state action has met the dictates of
substantive due process.' Either way, later cases are destined for
appeal until the Supreme Court establishes a definitive standard.
Furthermore, because the Court refused to address the substan-
tive due process issue, review of the procedural due process issue
was impossible. In Harper the Court held that a judicial hearing
was not necessary to satisfy procedural due process require-
ments."3 5 The Riggins court entirely failed to address what type of
notice or hearing might satisfy due process in the context of a pre-
trial detainee. Trial courts choosing to follow Harper will have to
assume that the rights retained for a criminal defendant are no
more and no less than those for a prison inmate, and thus will be
subject to reversal for error. Other trial courts will have to decide
for themselves what procedural safeguards are necessary, including
whether a pretrial detainee is entitled to a judicial hearing con-
cerning the forced medication. These courts will expend their re-
sources on judicial hearings to avoid the possibility of error. Either
way, limited judicial resources, both in terms of time and money,
will have to be utilized to determine cases which might have been
controlled by Riggins had the Court been inclined to establish the
necessary guidelines.
Finally, in addressing the third issue presented, the Court again
failed to establish guidelines which may be used to determine vio-
lation of a criminal defendant's trial rights. 136 Instead, the Court
relied on "possibilities" and "probabilities" to support its decision
that the side effects of the medication administered involuntarily
may have resulted in prejudice by the jury. 137 No standard was set
forth and no reason was given as to why such a risk was sufficient
to justify reversal of Riggins' convictions. As a result, trial courts
are given less than nothing upon which to rely because not even
the strict scrutiny standard for balancing an individual's funda-
mental rights against a state's interests was upheld with any confi-
necessary to further some governmental purpose. Black's Law Dictionary 1422 (West, 6th
ed 1990).
134. Harper, 494 US at 223-24.
135. Harper, 494 US at 235.
136. See Riggins, 112 S Ct at 1817. The Court intimated that strict scrutiny is re-
quired by noting that the record contained no finding supporting a conclusion that the anti-
psychotic medication was "necessary" to accomplish an "essential" state policy. Id.
137. Id at 1816-17.
936 Vol. 31:915
Recent Decisions
dence by the Court.
Hopefully when the Court is next faced with these issues, the
majority will be able to establish with some clarity the standard
and procedures necessary to meet due process requirements under
the Due Process Clause. Unfortunately, if the opinion of the dis-
senting Justice becomes the majority, not only will substantive and
procedural due process requirements not be addressed, but the ex-
istence of a liberty interest in freedom from unwanted medication
will not be sufficient to justify review of the case at all. Instead,
rigid application of Supreme Court jurisdictional rules will force




138. Id at 1821.
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